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Abstract: This paper explores the effects of European integration on national level legislatures 
in European Union member states. Many economic and political decisions previously made by 
democratically elected national legislatures are now decided at a supranational, or European, 
level. National legislatures have responded to this change by increasing their oversight of 
European affairs in order to impose more democratic accountability and transparency into the 
opaque decision-making process of developing European legislation. While all national 
legislatures of European Union member states have established European Affairs Committees to 
help strengthen oversight of European affairs, there is considerable variation in the institutional 
strength and political control invested in these committees.  I argue that the more recently a 
country joined the European Union, the more likely its European Affairs Committee will have 
the power to issue binding recommendations to the government. Cross-sectional statistical 
analysis shows a strong correlation between the timing of membership and a legislature's 
approach to parliamentary oversight of European affairs. 
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As the European Union has integrated more deeply politically and economically, it has 
grown to include joint decision-making across an expanding amount of policy space. This 
development has made it increasingly difficult for citizens to hold decision makers accountable 
for policy decisions made at the European level. Cabinet ministers negotiate on a member state’s 
behalf at the Council of Ministers meetings at the European Union, but it can be difficult for 
voters or members of parliament to know what is being discussed at Council of Ministers 
meetings and to know that their interests are being adequately represented. National parliaments 
have set up European Affairs Committees (EACs) in order to increase their influence over 
policies that have moved from the national level to the supranational (European Union) level by 
holding executives accountable for their negotiations at the Council of Ministers meetings. 
Ideally, these EACs will inject more transparency and democratic accountability in the area of 
European affairs. However, there is significant cross-national variation in how much political 
and institutional strength have been invested in the EACs. Why does one legislature establish an 
EAC with the power to bind the government in its negotiations at the European level? Why does 
another legislature set up an EAC but withhold from it the authority to really monitor the 
behavior of the government at the European level or withhold the staff and funding necessary to 
read and evaluate all the documents produced at the European level? 
Legislatures vary in the degree of control they attempt to exert in their oversight of 
European Affairs. In general, national legislatures in the European Union member states fall into 
two broad categories: those that try to exert control over the government with a mandating 
oversight approach and those that use a non-mandating oversight approach. Legislatures that use 
the mandating approach can use a systematic or a non-systematic approach to the oversight of 
European affairs, but in both cases the EAC has the power to issue binding instructions to the 
  2government for its negotiations at the Council of Ministers. Within the non-mandating approach 
there are also two different categories: informal oversight and document-based scrutiny.  
This paper will begin by describing previous efforts to measure the cross-national 
variation in EAC strength. Next it will explain a procedure-based method of measuring the cross-
national variation in EAC strength and introduce the candidate explanations for this variation. 
The candidate explanations include the timing of membership, the center-periphery cultural 
divide, postmodern values, public support for the EU and the concentration or diffusion of power 
within the national parliament.  Finally, the paper will use statistical analysis to evaluate the 
candidate explanations and will demonstrate that the timing of membership is the most 
significant explanations for the variation in EAC strength. 
 
1.  Measuring the cross-national variation in EACs 
There is strong cross-national variation in the strength and procedures of parliamentary 
oversight of European Affairs. The literature includes several different ways of sorting out the 
variation into ordinal categories. These categories have been based on the binding nature of an 
EAC’s instructions, on policy influence of EACs and on the oversight procedures employed by 
EACs. One popular way to sort EACs is by their ability to influence the government in its 
policy-formation at the European level. Studies that take this approach commonly sort 
parliaments into strong, medium and weak, based on the “bindingness” of the committee’s 
instructions
2 or based on the involvement of specialized standing committees.
3  
In his 1997 article, Torbjorn Bergman sorts the EACs into an ordinal variable of low (I), 
medium (II) and high (III), based on his subjective estimation of their strength, which he formed 
                                                 
2 Bergman 1997 and Bergman 2000 
3 Raunio and Wiberg 2000 
  3by reading everything available in 1996 about the EACs. Bergman’s initial categorization of 
EACs includes the following factors: Which actors participate in the process (MPs, MEPs, 
Länder)? Which of the EU’s policy pillars are covered by parliamentary scrutiny?
4 Does the 
scrutiny process involve the whole parliament (plenary session) or is it monopolized by the 
European Affairs Committee? If the parliament is bicameral, do both chambers participate in 
parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs? If so, is there a difference in how they participate? How 
binding are the EAC’s recommendations on the government?  
This final question has developed into an interesting dependent variable that several 
scholars are attempting to explain. The EU member states for which there is data on this topic 
(the EU-15) fit into three basic categories. The first category (weak parliamentary scrutiny) 
contains parliaments where the EAC oversees an informational exchange. The government sends 
representatives on occasion to report on negotiations at the Council of Ministers and on the 
development of EU legislation. The second category (medium parliamentary scrutiny) includes 
parliaments where the EAC makes recommendations to the government regarding its 
negotiations at the European level. The government is not required to follow these 
recommendations, but in practice it usually does. The third category (strong parliamentary 
scrutiny) involves the committee holding an ex ante veto over the government’s negotiating 
position at the European level. If the government needs or wants to deviate from the instructions 
it was given by the European Affairs Committee, then it must obtain permission from the 
committee. Subsequent studies by Bergman and others have continued to fine-tune the rankings, 
but the categories have remained largely stable. In 2000, Bergman refined his measure by 
                                                 
4 Pillar I includes European Community legislation, Pillar II is Common Foreign and Security Policy and Pillar III is 
Justice and Home Affairs. Within the framework of decision-making in the Council of Ministers, Pillar I falls under 
Qualified Majority Voting, while the other two pillars use a unanimity rule for voting. This means that it is more 
difficult to veto an unpopular bill if it falls under Pillar I than if it falls under the other pillars. 
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estimation in 1999. There was some reorganization between 1996 and 1999, with Finland and 
Sweden listed stronger in the second measure than they were in the first. Raunio and Wiberg 
(2000) also devise a subjective ordinal variable based on 1999 information and it matches closely 
to Bergman (2000).  
Another approach is to sort EACs by their policy influence. The strongest category is 
“‘policy-making’ parliaments which can reject government policies and substitute them with 
their own.” The middle category includes “moderate ‘policy-influencing’ parliaments which are 
able to reject or amend government policies but not substitute them.” The weakest category 
includes “weak parliaments with ‘little or no policy effect.’”
5  Maurer combines three major 
elements in his classification of EACs: (1) the scope of scrutiny, (2) timing and management of 
scrutiny, and (3) impact of scrutiny.
6 In his measure of EAC strength, Rozenberg combines the 
impact of the EAC with resources available to the EAC (number of clerks, etc.), committee’s 
level of activity (frequency of meetings, size of committee), and involvement of other 
parliamentary committees.
7
Ana Fraga points out that the prior categorizations are not measuring what they claim to 
measure.
8 The prior models claim to compare actual parliamentary influence over governments, 
but this is nearly impossible to measure. Instead, the categorizations have been based on 
potential influence more than effective influence. A true measure of effective influence would 
need to examine the oversight process with European legislation as the unit of analysis. 
                                                 
5 Kiiver 2004, describing Norton 1995 and Maurer/Wessels 2001 
6 Maurer 2001 
7 Rozenberg 2002 
8 Fraga 2000 
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find no evidence it has been attempted.   
Fraga proposes sorting parliamentary oversight committees based on their oversight 
process rather than oversight effectiveness. Fraga’s three categories are: “information and 
informal influence, systematic scrutiny and mandate.”
9  Fraga describes the first category, 
information and informal influence, as “parliaments influence[ing] the national position through 
meetings with members of government during which a two-way communication is established 
(the government explains what is the subject in question and the parliamentarians express their 
opinion).” The scope of this oversight approach is narrow. The EAC would only focus on highly 
salient issues as they come to the parliament’s attention. Fraga describes the second category, 
systematic scrutiny, as a “parliament giv[ing] its opinion in a systematic way upon all subjects 
(or those included in the parliamentary reserved competence) through the adoption of a report or 
a resolution.”
10 The parliament also follows up with the government to find out if the 
government followed the parliament’s suggestion during negotiations at the Council. Fraga 
describes the third category, the mandate, as an arrangement where the parliament tells the 
government what negotiation positions it must take at the Council.  
The Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees (COSAC) appears to 
have followed Fraga’s lead in its third biannual report,
11 which surveys the oversight processes 
of the 34 EACs that have been established in the 25 current member states of the European 
Union.
12 This COSAC report divides the 34 European Affairs Committees into three broad 
                                                 
9 Fraga 2000, 2 
10 Fraga 2000, 2 
11 COSAC 2005 
12 The third biannual report was prepared by the COSAC Secretariat and presented to the XXXIII Conference of 
Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union, 17-18 May 2005 
Luxembourg. COSAC is an organization that brings together representatives of national parliaments and the 
European parliament. Since the spring 2004 Irish Presidency, COSAC has been issuing biannual reports with each 
  6categories of oversight approaches: (1) informal channels of influence, (2) document-based 
scrutiny, and (3) mandating systems. Mandating systems are divided into two subcategories to 
distinguish between systematic and non-systematic mandating systems. In addition to describing 
three main categories of oversight approaches, the COSAC report also includes self-reported 
information from representatives of the 34 EACs on the approach that their committee uses for 
its oversight of European Affairs. This information forms the basis for the dependent variable in 
this paper.  
 
2.  Dependent variable: degree of control in parliamentary oversight approach 
This paper’s dependent variable is the degree of control the legislature attempts to exert 
in parliamentary oversight of European Affairs. The data in this variable comes from the third 
biannual report of the Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees (COSAC).
13 
COSAC is an organization that brings together representatives of national parliaments and the 
European parliament. When a country occupies the EU presidency, the COSAC meeting is one 
of the many meetings that the presidency country hosts as a part of its 6 month term. COSAC 
describes its founding and mission in these terms: 
 
COSAC was created in May 1989 at a meeting in Madrid, where the speakers of the 
Parliaments of the EU Member states agreed to strengthen the role of the national 
parliaments in relation to the community process by bringing together the European 
affairs Committees. The first meeting of COSAC took place in Paris in November 1989. 
COSAC was formally recognized [sic] in a protocol to the Amsterdam Treaty that was 
concluded by Heads of State or Government in June 1997. The protocol came into force 1 
                                                                                                                                                             
meeting. These reports give information from all COSAC members on their methods of parliamentary oversight. 
The third biannual COSAC report is “based on information provided by national parliaments of the EU-25 in 
responses to a questionnaire which was distributed in March 2005. Parliaments were requested to send in their 
responses by 4 April 2005, and this report takes account of developments up to that date” (COSAC 2005, 3). 
13 This report was prepared by the COSAC Secretariat and presented to the XXXIII Conference of Community and 
European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union, 17-18 May 2005 in Luxembourg. 
  7May 1999. According to this protocol, COSAC is allowed to address to the EU 
institutions any "contributions" which it deems necessary.
14  
 
Beginning with the Irish Presidency in Spring 2004, COSAC has been issuing biannual 
reports after each meeting. These reports give information from all COSAC members on their 
methods of parliamentary oversight.
15 As explained above, the third biannual COSAC report 
divides the 34 European Affairs Committees into three broad categories of oversight approaches: 
(1) informal channels of influence, (2) document-based scrutiny, and (3) mandating systems. 
Mandating systems are divided into two subcategories to distinguish between systematic and 
non-systematic mandating systems. The next two sections describe the non-mandating oversight 
approaches that are used by EACs. These are informal channels of influence and document-
based scrutiny. The next two sections after that describe the systematic and non-systematic 
mandating oversight approaches. Finally, Table 1 indicates the oversight approach used by each 
of the 34 EACs in the EU-25 countries in 2005.  
 
2a. Informal channels of influence 
The informal influence oversight approach is a non-mandating oversight approach. It is 
“characterised by the absence of a systematic examination of EU draft legislative acts and other 
EU documents.”
16 These EACs work to inform the parliament about legislative proposals being 
developed in the European Union and may organize debates on some of these topics. They can 
ask the government for explanations for its actions, but the government is not necessarily 
required to answer the questions or follow the committee’s suggestions.   
                                                 
14 http://www.cosac.eu/en/cosac/ [accessed 23 September 2006] 
15 The third biannual COSAC report is “based on information provided by national parliaments of the EU-25 in 
responses to a questionnaire which was distributed in March 2005. Parliaments were requested to send in their 
responses by 4 April 2005, and this report takes account of developments up to that date” (COSAC 2005, 3). 
16 COSAC 2005, 14 
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Insofar as these parliaments wish to exert influence over EU policies, they do so via more 
informal or political channels rather than via systematic or formal mechanisms in 
parliamentary committees. Parliamentary committees on European affairs in these 
parliaments therefore have a primary function of initiating or generating debate on 
important general European issues inside the parliaments as well as in relation to the 
public.
17  
 
The countries that have legislatures that use an informal scrutiny system are Belgium, Cyprus, 
the German Bundestag, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain.  
The Belgian Federal Advisory Committee on European Affairs provides a concrete example 
of an informal scrutiny approach. The Belgian committee describes its role in terms of its 
relationship with the parliament and with the government.
18 For the parliament, the EAC 
coordinates parliamentary action, monitors national legislation as it relates to European Affairs, 
delivers opinions on EU treaty negotiations and European affairs in general, manages inter-
parliamentary cooperation among the various national, regional and European level legislatures, 
and informs standing committees in the Belgian parliament of developments at the European 
level. As it relates to the government, the EAC listens to the federal government’s agendas 
before European Council meetings and results after those meetings. The EAC also evaluates the 
Government’s reports on the transposition of European laws into Belgian law.
19  The Belgian 
EAC is not collecting information in an exhaustive and systematic way, as in a document-based 
oversight system. The Belgian EAC is also not trying to direct the government in its activities in 
the European Council. Instead, the Belgian EAC’s main roles are to inform the parliament about 
European Affairs, to coordinate parliamentary activity in European Affairs, and to listen to the 
government’s description of its activity at the European level. 
                                                 
17 COSAC 2005, 14 
18 http://www.senate.be/doc/eu/fedadv_en.html [accessed 23 September 2006] 
19 http://www.senate.be/doc/eu/fedadv_en.html [accessed 23 September 2006] 
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2b. Document-based scrutiny 
The document-based scrutiny system is a non-mandating oversight approach that 
examines documents from the European Union institutions. In each parliament that uses this 
approach, the European Affairs Committee scrutinizes EU documents as early as possible in the 
European decision making process. “Typically, the responsible committee will report to its 
chamber on the political and legal importance of each EU document, determining which 
documents require further consideration.”
20 The EACs that use a document-based approach do 
not seek to control the government’s negotiations at the European level or even follow the 
“proceedings at individual Council meetings.”
21 Their focus is on systematically examining the 
information flowing from the European Union and informing the rest of the legislature about 
developments in the European legislative process. The legislatures that use a document-based 
scrutiny system are in the Czech Republic, France, Ireland, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands Senate 
and United Kingdom.  
The United Kingdom House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee illustrates the 
differences between the informal oversight approach and document-based scrutiny. The 
European Scrutiny Committee describes its role in the following way: 
 
The Committee assesses the legal and/or political importance of each EU document, 
decides which EU documents are debated, monitors the activities of UK Ministers in the 
Council, and keeps legal, procedural and institutional developments in the EU under 
review.
22
 
This committee is not trying to tell the British government what it can or cannot negotiate at the 
European level. Instead the committee’s goal is to gather information, evaluate the importance of 
                                                 
20 COSAC 2005, 10 
21 COSAC 2005, 10 
22 http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/european_scrutiny.cfm [accessed 23 September 2006] 
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“scrutiny reserve” that stops the government from making any decisions or taking any decisive 
action on proposals that the committee is still considering or that are waiting to be debated by the 
parliament. Even though document-scrutiny systems do not usually monitor the proceedings of 
individual Council meetings, the House of Commons’ EAC does use parliamentary questions 
and interviews with government ministers to monitor developments in the Council. Sometimes 
the EAC “conducts general inquiries into legal, procedural or institutional developments in the 
EU.”
23 In this approach the EAC scrutinizes as much of the documentation from the EU as 
possible, but does not necessarily try to sway the government’s negotiations at the European 
level.  
 
2c. Mandating systems 
The mandating scrutiny system is the most controlling approach to parliamentary 
oversight of European Affairs.  There is a key distinction in terms of how systematic the 
mandating system is; however for all mandating systems, “the European affairs committees in 
these parliaments have the capacity on behalf of their parliaments to adopt positions which are 
binding for their governments.”
24 The EACs that use non-systematic mandating systems use 
their mandating power infrequently, but the EACs with a systematic mandating system use their 
mandating power on a regular basis.  
 
2.c.i  Non-systematic mandating systems 
                                                 
23 http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/european_scrutiny.cfm [accessed 23 September 2006] 
24 COSAC 2005, 12 
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government what its negotiating positions should be at the Council of Ministers, but they use this 
authority infrequently. Sometimes the EAC’s mandating authority only extends to a narrow 
range of policy areas, other times the authority is wide-ranging but rarely used. It is common in 
non-systematic mandating systems for the EAC to be given information about the government’s 
position on European affairs only if specially requested by the committee, usually at the 
prompting of a government minister or a member of the European Affairs Committee.
25  
Countries that use a non-systematic mandating system are Austria, the German Bundesrat, 
Hungary, and the Netherlands House of Representatives.  
The Netherlands House of Representatives’ (Tweede Kamer) Standing Committee on 
European Affairs illustrates the non-systematic mandating system, describing its role in the 
following way:  
In 1986 the House of Representatives established a committee on European Affairs, 
which is now known as the Standing Committee on European Affairs. The committee's 
task is to play an ‘initiating, signalling [sic] and coordinating’ role for the purpose of 
parliamentary control of decision making in the European institutions, and particularly 
the Council.
26
 
The Standing Committee on European Affairs is in place to coordinate parliamentary control of 
European decision-making. This legislature includes sectoral committees in oversight of 
European Affairs and stresses the need to control the government in this area. The strongest area 
of parliamentary control over European Affairs is that of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA): 
 
In general the scrutiny system in the Netherlands is not one that is based on a mandate. 
However, on issues relating to Justice and Home Affairs both the Senate and the House 
of Representatives have special rights as regards controlling the position taken by the 
Dutch government in the JHA Council. The Government cannot agree to a European 
                                                 
25 COSAC 2005, 12 
26 http://www.houseofrepresentatives.nl/the_tweede_kamer_present_and_past/dossiers/dossier1.jsp [accessed 23 
September 2006] 
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Netherlands until both Houses of Parliament have given their assent. A special committee 
on Justice and Home Affairs prepares the assent of the House of Representatives.
27
 
While the Netherlands delegates the oversight of “broader, more general and horizontal 
developments in Europe” to the European Affairs Committee, the sectoral committees in the area 
of Justice and Home Affairs are the most assertive and have the most control over Government 
behavior at the European level.
28 The mandating power of parliamentary oversight in the 
Netherlands is limited to Justice and Home Affairs.  
 
2.c.ii  Systematic mandating systems 
Systematic mandating oversight EACs can use their mandating power over many different policy 
areas of European legislation. It is common in systematic mandating systems for the government 
to be required “to present a negotiation position – in writing or orally - to the committees on all 
pieces of draft legislation to be adopted by the Council.”
29  The volume of information flowing 
from the European Union to the national parliaments can be overwhelming, so parliaments have 
to develop methods of sorting through the information to identify the most important issues and 
determine which parts of European legislation merit further scrutiny and which do not. Effective 
filtering of information is critical because time is scarce in national parliaments and budgets for 
support staff are usually small. The EAC has to be disciplined and organized to focus its 
attention on the most important issues.
30  
                                                 
27 COSAC 2005, 59 
28 COSAC 2005, 58 
29 COSAC 2005, 12 
30 COSAC provides some examples of the filtering mechanisms employed by various EACs with systematic 
mandating oversight: “Whereas the Danish European affairs committee mandates ministers on all proposals of 
“greater importance” to be adopted by the Council, the Lithuanian Parliament has asked its sectoral committees to 
divide the different EU-proposals into three categories: “very relevant”, “relevant” and “moderately relevant.” These 
are normally referred to as “red”, “yellow” and “green” issues. On “red” and “yellow” issues the government is 
obliged to submit its negotiation “position” on all EU-proposals to the Seimas within 15 days from the receipt of the 
  13In contrast to the Dutch parliamentary oversight system, there are no formal limits on the 
scope of parliamentary oversight in a systematic mandating system. Instead, the limits are 
practical and relate to the capacity of the legislature to process the large amount of information 
produced by European-level bureaucrats, analyze the impact of pending legislation while it is 
still being developed at the European-level and hold national executives accountable for their 
negotiations at the Council of Ministers.  
It would be very difficult for a single committee to process the large volume of 
information coming from the European Union, much less possess the expertise to effectively 
scrutinize such a wide range of policy areas. One powerful institutional tool that some European 
Affair Committees wield is the power to delegate scrutiny of particular policies to other, more 
specialized committees. EACs that have this institutional power are able to save energy for 
scrutinizing “big picture” policies as they are being developed at the European level without 
being bogged down in very technical discussions. These EACs can also tap into the policy 
expertise that the more specialized parliamentary committees possess.  
The countries that have legislatures that use a systematic mandating scrutiny system are 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden. Denmark 
was the first country to develop a systematic mandating approach to the parliamentary oversight 
of European Affairs. The Danish EAC was described by Mr. Jacob Buksti, a Danish member of 
parliament, as “a sort of mini-parliament” which “acts on behalf of the parliament.”
31 The 
Danish EAC coordinates debate in the plenary chamber, but continues the parliamentary 
discussion within the committee. The committee is designed to competently represent the larger 
                                                                                                                                                             
proposals. “Green” issues are those classified by the committees as being of minor or no interest to the Parliament” 
(COSAC 2005, 12). 
31 Excerpt from the minutes of an Irish Joint Committee on European Affairs meeting (19 January 2004) when 
visited by the delegation from the Danish European Union Affairs Committee. 
http://debates.oireachtas.ie/DDebate.aspx?F=EUJ20040119.xml&Node=9#N9 [accessed 10 October 2006] 
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in the parliament as a whole.
32 The committee “is responsible for general scrutiny of all EU 
matters. This responsibility includes mandating the Government before Council votes on all 
directives as well as regulations of a greater importance….The mandate is politically binding and 
is very strictly observed by the government.”
33 The Danish systematic mandating oversight 
approach has a wide scope and also a high degree of control over government behavior at the 
European level. Table 1 lists each EAC from the twenty-five EU member states, along with its 
oversight approach. The oversight approaches are listed from left to right ordered from the least 
assertive to the most assertive.  
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The oversight approach an EAC uses is determined by a legislature when the European 
Affairs Committee is established. Sometimes EACs are reformed later to use a different 
oversight approach, but this is rare. Usually reforms to an EAC make changes to procedures or 
intensity of oversight, but the overall oversight approach stays the same. To account for changes 
in the oversight approach over time, wherever possible, the independent variables that vary over 
time represent the year that the EAC was established or last reformed. Even if the overall 
oversight approach did not change after an EAC was reformed, it could have changed, so in 
effect the legislature has chosen the current oversight approach again.  
 
3.  Explanatory variable: Timing of membership  
                                                 
32 COSAC 2005, 29 
33 COSAC 2005, 29 
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by the way most legislators evaluate the effects of Europeanization on legislative effectiveness. 
If most legislators view Europeanization as undermining legislative effectiveness, then the 
legislature will set up a more assertive parliamentary oversight mechanism in European Affairs. 
If the most legislators do not view Europeanization as a threatening trend at the time that the 
EAC is established, then the EAC will use a less assertive approach to oversight. Factors that can 
influence the oversight approach most legislators prefer for overseeing European affairs include 
the country’s relationship with the EU and the priority that legislators place on the oversight of 
European affairs. These two factors are explained below. 
The timing of membership both reflects and shapes a country’s relationship with the 
European Union. Early joiners participated in designing the European Union, so they are “rule 
makers” in the context of European institutions. They are very influential actors within the EU 
and in some cases don’t see a strong distinction between European interests and domestic 
interests. For example, the president of Luxembourg’s Christian Democratic Party (the Christian 
Social Party, CSV) in 2005 stated that “European politics are home politics” and that many of 
the questions which people believe are national questions are really only answerable in Europe.
34  
Late joiners are “rule takers” in the context of the European Union’s institutions. They 
did not participate in designing the institutions, so they have to work harder to achieve national 
goals through European institutions. While it is true that the countries that joined the EU later are 
in many cases countries that were not invited to join until late, there some countries chose to 
delay joining the EU in spite of early invitations. If the timing of membership didn’t influence 
the role of a country in the EU, then the wealthy countries that delayed joining the EU should be 
                                                 
34 Translated from “CSV. De séchere Wee. Och an Europa.” A statement by François Biltgen, party president. 
www.csv.lu/text/news.php/1751 [Accessed 12 March 2005] 
  16just as influential in the EU as early joiners. However, the wealthy countries that declined early 
opportunities to join the EU, do seem to be disadvantaged relative to early joiners.  
The United Kingdom provides a concrete example of this phenomenon. The United 
Kingdom has a large economy and has historically been a powerful country in the region of 
Western Europe. The UK had an opportunity to participate in founding the EU in the 1950s, but 
declined the invitation. In the 1960s, when the UK was ready to join, Charles de Gaulle blocked 
its membership twice. It was not until 1973 that the United Kingdom established its membership 
in the EU.
35 Because the United Kingdom missed twenty years of participating in large and 
small decisions that determined the course of the organization, the EU doesn’t fit the UK as well 
as it fits Germany or France. The UK is extra vigilant in EU negotiations to protect national 
interests and has needed to negotiate special exceptions, such as a rebate for financing of the 
Common Agricultural Policy. Early joiners of the EU are less likely to need to negotiate special 
exceptions because the course of the organization is less likely to seriously conflict with their 
national interests. The UK has many characteristics of a core country, but it is at a relative 
disadvantage, because it joined the EU later than the other core countries.  
For all of these reasons the timing of a country’s membership in the European Union is 
likely to be a strong predictor of the assertiveness of a legislature’s European Affairs Committee. 
The more recently a country joined the European Union, the more control the domestic 
legislature tries to assert over European Affairs because the EU seems more unfamiliar to 
domestic processes and also more difficult to change. This variable is represented by the year 
that each country officially joined the European Union. The range of this variable is from 1952 
to 2004.  
 
                                                 
35 McCormick 2005, 65-67 
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4.  Competing hypotheses 
There are several competing hypotheses that may also explain the cross-national variation 
in EAC institutional strength. These competing explanations are the center-periphery cleavage, 
postmodern values, popular support, and the economic cleavage. See Table 2 for the expected 
signs for each independent variable.  
[Table 2 about here]  
 
4a. Center-periphery cultural cleavage 
The center-periphery distinction is used to explain relationships between societies. It 
draws on Immanuel Wallerstein’s World-Systems theory
36 and Stein Rokkan’s distinction 
between central establishment and subject peripheries.
37 Wallerstein considered Eastern Europe, 
Southern Europe, Ireland and Scandinavia to be part of the global periphery.
38 By this definition, 
we find that most of Wallerstein’s “core” in Western Europe coincides with the founding 
members of the EU and most of his European periphery coincides with the more recent members 
that have joined since 1973. Britain is the only country of Wallerstein’s European “core” that 
was not a founding member of the European Union.  
One of the main factors influencing a country’s relationship to the European Union is its 
physical distance from Brussels. This factor is inspired by Rokkan’s “distance from Rome” 
variable. Rokkan argued that distance from Rome was an important policy dimension in 
European politics because it indicates the degree to which the Roman Empire influenced the 
                                                 
36 Wallerstein 1974, 1982, 2004 
37 Rokkan 1975 
38 “In my own book on the long sixteenth century, I identified three main peripheral zones – Iberian America to be 
sure, but also eastern Europe and “southern” Europe. One could comfortably add Ireland and Scandinavia. I 
specifically excluded Asia (and Africa), and even the Ottoman Empire and Russia, on the grounds that they were not 
part of the capitalist world-economy in that era and could not therefore be thought of as peripheral zones in the 
single division of labour of this world-economy” (Wallerstein, 1982, 580). 
  18culture of each country. Countries that have a larger “geopolitical distance northward, from 
Rome, the fountainhead of the old Empire, the focus of Western Christendom after the Schism of 
1054 and the symbolic center for the effort of legal unification through the revival of Roman 
law” are more likely to have a history influenced by Germanic kingdoms than the Roman Empire 
(Rokkan 1975, 575).
39 Similarly, the European Union can be viewed as a modern-day empire, 
which has a stronger influence on the culture of countries that are closer to its geopolitical core 
than the periphery. One difference between the distance from Rome and distance from Brussels 
is that the distance from Rome is only considered in the Northern direction. Distance from 
Brussels can grow in any direction, because Brussels is centrally located in Europe.  
The center-periphery argument says that EU member states that are located on the EU’s 
periphery are likely to have stronger parliamentary oversight of European Affairs than member 
states located in the EU’s center. Peripheral countries work harder to have their interests 
reflected in European decisions, so they look to EACs as a way to boost the government’s 
negotiating power at Council of Ministers meetings. The more the national government can 
claim its hands are tied by a strong national parliament, the more inflexible the government can 
afford to be in its negotiations at the European level. An assertive EAC can be a way for a 
government to tie its own hands. If national parliaments believe than the government needs to 
strengthen its bargaining leverage at the European level, they will be more likely to establish an 
assertive EAC with a broad scope of oversight and mandate powers.  
In testing the center-periphery argument, I include variables for the distance from 
Brussels, the percentage of external trade within the European Union, and the size of the 
country’s economy at the time the EAC was established. Peripheral countries tend to have 
                                                 
39 See also Lipset and Rokkan (1967), Rokkan and Urwin (1982) and Rokkan, et al. (1987).  
 
  19smaller economies, be further away from Brussels and trade more outside of the European Union 
than the core countries will.   
One of the main factors influencing a country’s relationship to the European Union is its 
physical distance from Brussels. Countries that are very close to the European capital will be 
more easily influenced by European political and cultural trends. Countries that are far from 
Brussels will face more significant transportation costs, higher language barriers and a 
psychological distance due to reduced contacts with the political and cultural trends of the 
European Union. For example, national decision-makers from Sweden, Ireland, Greece or 
Poland must fly to Brussels if they want to meet with European decision-makers. It is only a 3 
hour train ride from Paris to Brussels. If French decision-makers want to attend a meeting at the 
European Commission, it could be a day trip. Linguistically, countries where French, German 
and English are the native languages usually don't have to translate documents flowing from the 
European Union. The farther a country is from Brussels, the more likely that EU documents will 
need to be translated before they can be thoroughly considered by national legislators. The 
farther a country's population center is removed from Brussels, the more transaction costs 
associated with participating in European affairs. I measure this difference between central and 
peripheral countries with the distance between the country’s population center in 2000 and the 
city of Brussels.
40
Central countries also tend to be more economically engaged with the European Union 
than peripheral members, and this is reflected in the percentage of each country's external trade 
that occurs within the European Union. Peripheral countries are more likely to cultivate and 
maintain trading partners outside of the European Union. Countries frequently have robust trade 
                                                 
40 Source: Center for International Earth Science Network (CIESN) Gridded Population of the World (GPWv3) 
available online: http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/gpw/ 
  20with the countries closest to them.
41 Countries on the far Southern or Eastern edges of the 
European Union frequently have a tradition of trading with neighboring states that are not a part 
of the European Union. Countries in the center of Western Europe are surrounded by other EU 
member states, so they are more likely to trade within the EU. To measure the degree of 
economic engagement with the European Union, I use the percentage of total exports that are 
sold within the European Union in 2005.
42
Countries with large economies are likely to be more attractive to and influential in an 
economic union (like the European Union) than countries with small economies. When a country 
with a large economy joins an economic union, the union's overall economic power can increase 
substantially. When a country with a small economy joins an economic union, it is less likely to 
have a noticeable impact on the economic union's overall GDP and ability to project soft, 
economic power globally. Because they are less attractive to the EU, countries with smaller 
economies are likely to have joined the EU later. Also, countries with smaller economies may 
feel more vulnerable to EU policies than countries with larger economies. If a hypothetical EU 
policy has adverse effects on a country with a large economy, the effects will most likely be felt 
by the whole EU. The EU as a whole could prosper based on a policy that has adverse effects on 
the small economies but benefits the large economies.  This perceived vulnerability is likely to 
inspire countries with small economies to establish assertive EACs that can limit the range of 
concessions that the government can make in its negotiations at the European level. This variable 
                                                 
41 Linneman 1969 
42 Source: Statistical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat), Eurostat Yearbook 2005. Available online: 
http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/ 
  21is measured using the GDP in the year that the EAC was established, standardized for United 
States dollars in the year 2000.
43
 
4b. Postmodern cultural values 
Economic change coincides with value change as societies transition from being pre-
modern to modern to postmodern.
44 Pre-modern societies tend to have agrarian economies, while 
modern societies have industrial economies. Postmodern societies have post-industrial 
economies dominated by the service sector. Pre-modern and modern societies are both focused 
on survival, while post-modern societies take survival for granted and focus instead on self-
expression. Societies that emphasize survival over self-expression are described in this way: 
Societies that emphasize survival values have relatively low levels of subjective well-
being, report relatively poor health, and are low on interpersonal trust, relatively 
intolerant of outgroups, and low on support for gender equality. They emphasize 
materialist values, have relatively high levels of faith in science and technology and are 
relatively low on environmental activism and relatively favorable to authoritarian 
government.
45  
 
Societies that emphasize survival values are likely to have very little oversight of leaders in 
general and the European Union, in particular. At their most extreme, these societies encourage 
“people to accept their social position in this life, emphasizing that meek acceptance and denial 
of worldly aspirations will be rewarded in the next life.”
46 Societies that emphasize self-
expression tend to celebrate diversity. They “reflect an emancipative and humanistic ethos, 
                                                 
43 Source: United States Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/macroeconomics/Data/HistoricalRealGDPValues.xls 
44 Modernization theorists argue that economic change causes societal change, while cultural theorists argue that 
cultural change causes economic change. Inglehart argues that there is a feedback effect between economic and 
social change (1997, 48). The one thing that all three of these approaches agree on is that social and economic 
change are linked.  
45 Inglehart 1997, 54 
46 Inglehart 1997, 71 
  22emphasizing human autonomy and choice.”
47 Societies that have post-modern cultural values 
tend to be skeptical of hierarchy, and be preoccupied with self-expression and quality of life.
48 
  The more a country’s society emphasizes self-expression values, the more likely it will 
have highly institutionalized oversight mechanisms for domestic and international political 
decision-making. Postmodernization “deemphasizes all kinds of authority, whether religious or 
secular, allowing much wider range for individual autonomy in the pursuit of individual 
subjective well-being.”
49 Citizens in postmodern societies demand accountability and 
transparency in government, so countries with value systems relatively closer to post-modernism 
are likely to have EACs with mandating oversight. 
Postmodern cultural values are measured using the Inglehart and Welzel factor scores for 
self-expression versus survival values.
50 These values are derived from a factor analysis of the 
answers to ten World Values Surveys questions between 1981 and 2001. The questions include 
the importance of God, the importance of teaching children obedience and faith rather than 
independence and determination, disapproval of abortion, national pride, respect for authority, a 
high priority for economic and physical security (materialist values), feelings of unhappiness, 
disapproval of homosexuality, abstaining from signing petitions and distrusting other people. 
The last five questions are weighted the heaviest in the factor analysis for survival versus self-
expression values.
51 The range for this variable is from -2 (survival values) to 2 (self-expression 
values). 
                                                 
47 Inglehart 1997, 54 
48 Inglehart describes cultural change as a “shift in survival strategies. … With the transition from Modernization to 
Postmodernization, the trajectory of change has shifted from maximizing economic growth to maximizing the 
quality of life” (1997, 66). 
49 Inglehart 1997, 74-75 
50 Inglehart and Welzel 2005 
51 Inglehart and Welzel 2005, Internet appendix (p. 8-12). For the factor scores, see Table A-1, “Predicted and 
Observed Value Systems (64 societies’ locations on 1999-2001 cultural map, predicted from model based on data 
from first three waves of surveys)” on p. 27 of the internet appendix. 
  23Postmodern values are associated with postindustrial economies. Postindustrial 
economies are dominated by the service sector and have much smaller agricultural and industrial 
sectors. The percentage of a country’s gross domestic product (GDP) that is produced by the 
service sector can serve as a proxy for the degree to which a country is experiencing 
postmodernism. This operationalization of postmodernism is measured using data from the 
World Development Indicators for the year that an EAC was established or last reformed. The 
range is from a low of 55 (United Kingdom in 1974 when its EAC was established and Ireland in 
2002 when its EAC was reformed) to a high of 73 (Latvia in 2004). 
 
4c. Popular support for European Union 
Democratically elected leaders must maintain the support of the public in order to stay in 
office. This fact of democratic life gives decision makers a strong incentive to track and respond 
to the demands of the public. Two tactics that legislators use to maintain public support include 
credit claiming and position taking.
52  If legislators sense that the public is skeptical of European 
integration, they are likely to produce signals to the public that national interests are being 
protected and that the national-level democratic infrastructure is working to provide 
accountability and transparency in European Affairs. Legislators will try to claim credit for 
popular policies at the European level, either through supporting the government in its 
negotiations at the Council of Ministers or by holding the government accountable for its 
negotiations.  Even if it’s not possible for backbenchers to really influence decision-making at 
the European level, they can still use the EAC as a forum for taking positions on European 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/publications/humandevelopment.html [accessed 20 February 2007] 
52 Mayhew 1974, Budge and Laver 1986 
  24issues. This position-taking shows constituents that their legislators are actively representing 
national interests at the European level, regardless of the effectiveness of the representation. 
If party discipline is weak, the strategic calculation is made by individual MPs and this 
trend will be more visible at the party level than in the behavior of individual legislators. If it is 
strong, the calculation is made at the party level.  Parties can encourage their MPs to use 
legislative committees as a platform for signaling the party's influence over European Affairs if 
the issue is salient to the electorate.  Regardless of the decision-making level, the strategic 
calculations follow a similar pattern. The strategic calculation involves two elements: the 
saliency of the issue and the level of popular support. If saliency is high and public support is 
high, then MPs want to take credit for good things that the public approves of. If saliency is high 
and public support is low, then MPs may want to take visible positions against the unpopular 
issue. If saliency is low, then there is little incentive for MPs to take prominent positions or 
provide a high level of transparency, regardless of the popularity of the issue.  
When applying these principles to the issue of European integration, we see the dynamic 
playing out in the design and functions of the European Affairs Committee.  If the public is 
uncomfortable with European integration, there is a strong incentive for the parliament to invest 
a lot of resources in the oversight of European Affairs. On the other hand, in a country with a 
permissive consensus for European integration, the public is less likely to look for strong 
accountability mechanisms in European Affairs. European decision-making will be less salient in 
countries with broad support for European integration therefore politicians will not get much 
attention for their credit-claiming or position-taking behaviors in European Affairs. 
Legislatures in countries with weak public support for EU membership are more likely to 
establish an EAC with a mandating oversight approach than in countries with low levels of 
  25Euroscepticism. If the European Union enjoys a permissive consensus from the electorate of a 
country, there is less incentive for members of parliament to invest resources in a robust 
oversight mechanism in European Affairs. Instead of setting up an EAC with mandating 
oversight, parliament will focus on providing other public goods that the public is demanding. 
Public support for EU membership is measured using a survey question that is regularly 
asked in the Eurobarometer survey. Prior studies on the cross-national variation in the strength of 
EACs examine the relationship between public opinion and EAC strength and they do find a 
correlation.
53 The main difficulty with relying on public opinion for an explanation for 
committee strength is that public opinion develops in response to particular events and 
experiences and it is strongly influenced by values and historical narratives. 
The first public opinion variable is derived from the Eurobarometer question asking, 
“Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY’S) membership of the European 
Union is a good thing?” The data represents the percent of respondents giving a positive answer 
to the question.
54 The “good thing” Eurobarometer question has been the question most 
frequently used in the literature on this topic.  
 
4d. Concentration or diffusion of power in parliament  
This hypothesis says that the assertiveness of an EAC depends on the concentration or 
diffusion of power in parliament. Some legislatures concentrate most power in the hands of the 
government, while others spread power out among several veto players.
55 If the government 
dominates the parliament, then the European Affairs Committee is likely to use a non-mandating 
                                                 
53 Bergman 2000 and Raunio and Wiberg 2000 
54 Source: EB 64 (Fall 2005).  
55 Veto players are “individual or collective actors [that] have to agree to [a] proposed change” before a policy 
change can occur (Tsebelis 2002, 2). 
  26oversight approach. This is because a dominant government will not agree to be constrained by 
an oversight committee with the power to issue binding recommendations. If there are multiple 
veto players and parliament generally has a lot of leverage over the government, then the 
European Affairs Committee is more likely to use a mandating oversight approach.  This paper 
measures the concentration of power in parliament in several ways. The operationalizations are 
the number of partisan veto players in the year the EAC was established,
56 parliamentary agenda 
control, corporatism, the presence of a strong upper house, and the presence of an EAC in the 
upper house of parliament.  
Parties in the cabinet are partisan veto players.
57 These parties have the ability to veto 
policies and often they can be agenda setters by proposing new policies. The more parties there 
are in government, the more difficult it is to make decisive policy changes. Also, with a 
multiparty government cabinet parties want to monitor government ministers from coalition 
partners to be sure that they are honoring the coalition agreement in negotiations at the European 
level. If the EAC is established during a single-party government, it is most likely that the EAC 
will have a non-mandating oversight approach. The more parties there were in government when 
the EAC was established, the more likely the EAC will have a mandating oversight approach.
58   
Another way to measure the concentration or diffusion of power in a parliament is to 
examine the degree to which the government controls the plenary timetable. The way to control 
the agenda in a parliament is to control the plenary timetable. Time is scarce in parliaments and 
issues at the bottom of the plenary agenda are unlikely to be thoroughly debated. Therefore, the 
more the government can control the plenary timetable, the more power is concentrated in the 
                                                 
56 i.e. number of parties in the cabinet the year the EAC was established.  
57 Tsebelis 2002 
58 The data for the EU-15 countries comes from Coalition Governments in Western Europe (2003) edited by 
Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strøm. The data for the A10 countries comes from the InterParliamentary Union’s 
Parline database. 
  27government’s hands.
59  If non-governmental members of parliament are able to influence the 
plenary timetable, power is less concentrated in the government’s hands. This variable is 
measured using the agenda control scale developed by Döring to assess the degree to which 
parliament or the government has the authority to determine the plenary agenda.
60 The range of 
this variable is from 1 (government has all agenda power) to 7 (parliament has all agenda 
power). 
   Corporatism is another way to measure the concentration or diffusion of power in 
parliament. In a neo-corporatist interest group system, the government forms a partnership with 
“peak organizations” representing societal actors. Instead of the competition that is common in 
pluralist interest group systems, neo-corporatism encourages consensus-building in the process 
of formulating and implementing major political decisions. This corporatist pattern of shared 
power could translate to the government including parliamentary committees, such as European 
Affairs Committees in its decision-making process. In countries with a pluralist interest group 
system, the government is used to being lobbied by societal groups and protecting its decision-
making authority from competing interest groups. The pluralist pattern of decision-making could 
easily lead to governments excluding parliamentary committees from the decision-making 
process and would coincide with an expectation of less assertive oversight committees in 
pluralist countries.
61 This variable is based on a 1 to 5 scale, with 1 being the most pluralist 
economies and 5 being the most integrated (i.e. corporatist). Since the data source includes data 
from the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, I use the rating of corporatism that was taken closest to 
the year when the EAC was established. I expect to find a positive relationship between 
corporatism and mandating oversight in European affairs. 
                                                 
59 Laver and Shepsle 1994 and Martin 2004 
60 Döring 1995, 224 
61 Siaroff 1999, 190-193, tables 4a-4d 
  28 The last two operationalizations of the concentration of power have to do with 
institutional veto players, namely upper houses in a bicameral legislature. All upper houses 
influence decision-making in the lower house of parliament, but there is considerable variation in 
how strong and influential an upper chamber can be.
62 Arend Lijphart developed a classification 
for the strength of upper houses between 1945 and 1996 in thirty-six democracies.
63 Seventeen 
of the EU-25 countries are included in Lijphart’s analysis. Of the eight EU-25 countries excluded 
from Lijphart’s study, five of them are unicameral. This variable ranges from 1 (unicameral) to 4 
(strong bicameralism).  
Another way that an upper house can influence the oversight approach used by an EAC is 
by setting up an EAC in the upper house before the lower house has established its own EAC.  It 
is possible that the presence of an EAC in the upper house will make it likely that the lower 
house will empower its EAC to use a mandating oversight approach. This variable is a binary 
representation of the presence (1) or absence (0) of an EAC in the upper house of the 
legislature.
64 If a country is unicameral, it cannot have an EAC in the upper chamber, so it is 
coded as zero.   
 
5.  Quantitative Analysis 
  This section will discuss the methodology used to test this paper’s hypotheses. First I will 
discuss the way the dependent variable is measured and coded. Next I will discuss the estimation 
method I use for testing the model and the results from the statistical tests. Finally I will discuss 
statistical simulations that were used to generate quantities of interest and represent the 
                                                 
62 “All second chambers exercise influence even if they are considered weak or insignificant” (Tsebelis and Money 
1997, 211). 
63 Lijphart 1999 
64 Data drawn from COSAC 2005, 8-9 
  29probability of a legislature using a mandating EAC over a range of possible timings of 
membership.  
 
5a. Methodology 
The dependent variable indicates whether an EAC uses a mandating or non-mandating 
oversight approach. This variable is binary, so EACs with a non-mandating oversight approach 
are coded as zero and countries with a mandating oversight approach are coded as one. The 
values and frequency for the dependent variable are reported in Table 3.  
[Table 3 about here]  
 
The binary dependent variable makes it possible to use logistic regression to estimate the 
models. Logistic regression uses this equation to evaluate the relationship between a dependent 
variable and an independent variable or variables. 
Pr(y=1| x) =  exp(xβ)/(1+ exp(xβ)) 
This equation expresses the probability that the dependent variable equals one, given the 
independent variable x with coefficient beta (β).
65
One reason I chose logistic regression instead of OLS is that logistic regression does not 
assume a linear relationship. Another reason is that extreme values don’t affect the model as 
much in logistic regression as it does in OLS. A linear model assumes that a change in an 
independent variable always results in the same change in the dependent variable, regardless of 
the value of the independent variable. With the S-shaped logistic curve, the change in the 
dependent variable for the same change in the independent variable will depend on the value of 
the independent variable. If the independent value is an extreme, changing it will have less 
                                                 
65 Long 1997 
  30impact on the dependent variable than if the independent variable is near the transition point of 
the model (i.e. where the dependent variable passes 0.5). Finally, even if the dependent variable 
is coded as zero or one, the linear OLS model can give outputs for dependent variable values that 
are much greater than one or much less than zero. This is not sensible and logistic regression 
does not have this difficulty.
66  
I use bivariate logistic regressions for two reasons. First, the number of observations is 
small, so I do not want to use up all the degrees of freedom by throwing every variable into one 
multivariate regression. Second, many of the independent variables tend to be correlated with 
each other to some extent. Bivariate regressions avoid problems of collinearity and make it 
possible to compare the explanatory power of each independent variable separately.  
 
5b. Results for ordered logistic regressions 
For the statistical results from the logistic regressions, see Table 4. Table 4 shows the 
results of bivariate logistic regressions for the EU-25, limited to EACs in the lower houses of 
parliament. In Table 4, the only variable that meets the 95 percent confidence threshold is timing 
of membership. Early joiners are likely to have non-mandating EACs while late joiners are more 
likely to have mandating EACs.   
None of the other independent variables meet the 95 percent confidence threshold, but 
there are two variables that come close: popular support and agenda control. Popular support for 
EU membership is significant at the 0.062 level. This means I can be 93.8 percent certain that 
there is a relationship between public support and EAC oversight approach. The relationship is 
negative, which is the predicted sign. The more supportive the public is of European Union 
membership, the less likely the EAC will have a mandating oversight approach.  
                                                 
66 Long 1997 
  31Parliamentary agenda control is significant at the 0.074 level, which means I can be 92.6 
percent certain that there is a relationship between agenda control and EAC oversight approach. 
The relationship is positive, which is consistent with the predicted sign. The more influence non-
governmental members of parliament have over the parliamentary agenda, the more likely the 
EAC will have a mandating oversight approach.  
The center-periphery explanation argues that the more marginal the country is to the EU, 
the more likely the government will want to use an EAC to tie its hands. Many late joiners 
belong to the EU periphery and many early joiners belong to the EU’s core. The timing of 
membership is a stronger explanation than the center-periphery argument because the timing of 
membership influences the relationship of a country to the EU. Founding members were able to 
design the EU, therefore the institutional fit is better for those countries than for countries that 
joined more recently. While it is true that peripheral countries are the last to be invited to join, it 
is clear that joining later makes a country peripheral to the EU even if it has been a core country 
in the region. The center-periphery explanation is not supported by the statistical tests. Neither is 
the postmodern values explanation. This paper fails to reject the null hypothesis for each of these 
explanations. 
The concentration of power in parliament explanation is less clear. Agenda control is a 
significant factor, but the presence of a strong upper house or an EAC in the upper house does 
not seem to influence the decision of the lower house when it comes to assigning the EAC a 
mandating or non-mandating oversight approach. Additionally, the number of partisan veto 
players does not appear to significantly influence the assertiveness of oversight of European 
affairs and neither does the presence of a corporatist interest group.  
 
  325c. Statistical Simulations 
  In addition to logistic regressions, I used statistical simulation to generate quantities of 
interest and their uncertainties.
67 First, I simulated the first differences, which are “the difference 
between two expected, rather than predicted, values.”
68 First difference simulations make it 
possible to answer this question: for a typical legislature, how would the probability of 
establishing a particular type of EAC differ if the state joined the EU in 1952 versus 2004? The 
probability of establishing an informal EAC decreases by 33 percent. The probability of 
establishing a systematic mandating EAC increases by 40 percent.  
For a typical legislature, how would the probability of establishing a particular type of 
EAC differ if the state joined the EU in 1952 versus 1986? Compared with 1952, the probability 
of establishing an informal EAC decreases by 26 percent for a state that joins in 1986. The 
probability of establishing a systematic mandating EAC increases by 22 percent.  
  Statistical simulation was also used to generate Figures 4.1 and 4.2. Figure 4.1 illustrates 
the influence of membership timing on oversight approach used by an EAC. The length of the 
lines signifies the span of the 95 percent confidence interval for each value. The shorter the line, 
the more precise a prediction is possible. In the 1950s, there was a higher probability of a new 
member of the EU establishing an EAC with an informal oversight system than with a systematic 
mandate. By the turn of the century, it was much more likely that a new member of the EU 
                                                 
67 “Statistical simulation uses the logic of survey sampling to approximate complicated mathematical calculations. In 
survey research, we learn about a population by taking a random sample from it. We use the sample to estimate a 
feature of the population, such as its mean or its variance, and our estimates become more precise as we increase the 
sample size, n.  Simulation follows a similar logic but teaches us about probability distributions, rather than 
populations. We learn about a distribution by simulating (drawing random numbers) from it and using the draws to 
approximate some feature of the distribution. The approximation becomes more accurate as we increase the number 
of draws, M. Thus, simulation enables us to approximate any feature of a probability distribution without resorting 
to advanced mathematics” (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000, 349). Statistical simulations produced using 
CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results (Tomz, Michael, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary 
King 2001). 
68 King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000, 351 
  33would set up an EAC with a systematic mandate than an informal oversight system. The mid-to-
late 1970s appears to be the turning point. One event that occurred in the late 1970s that could 
account for national parliaments showing more assertiveness in European Affairs is the shift to 
direct elections for the European Parliament.
69 Before the late-1970s, National parliaments 
appointed Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and double-hatting was common 
between MPs and MEPs. When the European Parliament moved to direct elections, this reduced 
the influence of national parliaments on decision-making at the European level and produced an 
incentive to establish more assertive EACs.  
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Figure 4.1: Membership timing's influence on oversight
 
  Figure 4.2 compares the probability of a legislature establishing an EAC with a 
document-based scrutiny system or with a systematic mandate. In the 1950s and 1960s, there 
                                                 
69 Describing the motivation for establishing COSAC: “One important reason was a feeling of loss of contact with 
Community policies in many national parliaments after the introduction of direct elections to the European 
Parliament in 1979. Up to 1979, delegations to the European Parliament were appointed by national parliaments, and 
parliamentarians could be at the same time members of the national parliaments and European Parliament.” 
(COSAC Secretariat. “COSAC: Historical Development”, n.d., p.1) 
  34was a higher probability of a new member of the EU establishing an EAC with a document-
based oversight system than with a systematic mandate. By the turn of the century, it was much 
more likely that a new member of the EU would set up an EAC with a systematic mandate than a 
document-based scrutiny system. The mid-1980s is the turning point between these two 
oversight approaches. A development that occurred in the mid-1980s is the Single European Act 
(SEA), which signaled the EU’s intention to spread into new policy areas, such as social policy. 
As European integration deepened in these new policy areas, national parliaments could expect 
to lose influence over even more policy areas than before. This produced an incentive for new 
member states to establish even more assertive EACs. 
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Figure 4.2: Membership timing's influence on oversight
 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
What explains the cross-national variation in the assertiveness of European Affairs 
Committee oversight approaches? The more recently a country joined the European Union, the 
  35more likely its legislature will establish an EAC with the most assertive oversight approach. 
Other candidate explanations that were tested in this paper include the center-periphery cultural 
divide, postmodern values, public support for the EU and institutional strength of national 
parliaments, but none of these are significant explanations for the oversight approach used by the 
lower houses of parliament in the EU-25. 
This paper began by describing previous efforts to measure the cross-national variation in 
EAC strength. Next it explained a procedure-based method of measuring the cross-national 
variation in EAC strength and introduced the candidate explanations for this variation. Finally, 
the paper used statistical analysis to evaluate the candidate explanations and demonstrated that 
the timing of membership is the most significant explanations for the variation in EAC strength. 
  Based on the statistical simulations in section 5c, it seems likely that institutional 
developments in the EU can account for the difference in oversight approaches used by early and 
late joiners. In future research, I plan to compare the effects of significant events in the European 
Union on the design of EAC oversight approach. Some of the significant events that could 
influence a legislature’s decision to use a mandating oversight approach include the signing of 
major EU treaties such as the Single European Act (1986), the Maastricht Treaty (1992), The 
Amsterdam Treaty (1997), or the Treaty of Nice (2000). Also, the transition from members of 
the European Parliament being appointed by national parliaments to direct elections to the 
European parliament in 1979 could also influence national parliaments to use a more assertive 
oversight approach in European affairs.  
  
 
  36Table 1: Oversight approach used in national legislatures of the EU-25 in 2005
70
EAC oversight approach 
Non-mandating oversight  Mandating oversight 
Member State 
Informal channels  
of influence 
Document-based  
scrutiny 
Non-systematic Systematic 
Austria      X   
Belgium   X      
Cyprus  X      
Czech Republic    X     
Denmark       X 
Estonia       X 
Finland       X 
France    X     
Germany   X      
Greece  X      
Hungary     X   
Ireland   X     
Italy    X     
Latvia       X 
Lithuania       X 
Luxembourg  X      
Malta   X     
Netherlands     X   
Poland        X 
Portugal  X      
Slovakia       X 
Slovenia        X 
Spain   X      
Sweden       X 
United Kingdom    X     
 
 
                                                 
70 Data from COSAC 2005, 8-9 
  37Table 2: Expected Signs for Each Independent Variable  
Expected Sign  Independent 
Variables 
Hypotheses Operationalization   
 
Timing of 
Membership 
The more recently a state has joined 
the European Union, the more 
assertive its EAC will be. 
The year each country joined 
the European Union 
 
  
+ 
Historic GDP for the year 
each legislature established its 
EAC or last reformed its EAC 
(In billions, 2000 USD) 
- 
Distance of the country’s 
population center from 
Brussels (in hundreds of 
kilometers) in 2000 
+ 
Center-
periphery  
The closer a country is to the EU’s 
core, the less assertive the EAC will 
be.  
Percentage of total exports 
sold within the European 
Union in 2005 
- 
Inglehart-Welzel factor scores 
for survival versus self-
expression values. 
+  Postmodern 
cultural 
values 
The more postmodern a country’s 
values, the more assertive the EAC 
will be.  
The percentage of GDP 
produced by the service 
sector in the year EAC was 
established or last reformed. 
+ 
Public 
support for 
EU 
membership  
 
The more the public disapproves of 
EU membership, the more 
parliamentary assertiveness in 
oversight of European affairs 
increases. 
Public opinion: EU good 
thing, in the year EAC was 
established or last reformed  
 
- 
Number of Parties in 
government in the year EAC 
was established or last 
reformed  
+ 
Corporatism + 
Control of the plenary 
timetable  
+ 
Concentration 
of power in 
parliament  
The more power is concentrated in 
the government’s hands, the less 
assertive the EAC will be.  
Westminster parliament  - 
 
 
Table 3: Dependent Variable Summary 
Dependent variable  DV value  Frequency  Percent  Cumulative percent 
Non-mandating oversight approach   0  18  52.94  52.94 
Mandating oversight approach  1  16  47.06  100.0 
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Table 4: Bivariate logistic regressions, dependent variable is mandating oversight approach (1=yes, 0=no)
71
Independent Variables  Coefficient  Standard 
Error 
Pseudo 
R-squared 
Prob>chi2 Log 
Likelihood 
Absolute  
z-value 
P>|z|       Cases  
(N) 
Timing:               
Timing of Membership   0.056*     0.0254   0.1834  0.0117  -14.133  2.19     0.029       25 
 
Center-Periphery: 
Size of economy in year EAC  
established or last reformed (GDP)  
 
 
 
-0.004 
 
 
 
0.0026 
 
 
 
0.1536 
 
 
 
0.0211 
 
 
 
-14.649 
 
 
 
1.53 
 
 
 
0.126     
 
 
 
25 
Distance from Brussels   0.008    0.0613   0.0005  0.8964   17.300  0.13     0.896      25 
Trade within EU (2005)  0.035   0.0399  0.0224  0.3789  -16.922  0.87     0.386      25 
 
Postmodern Values:
Survival vs. Self-expression values (2005)  
 
 
-0.627     
 
 
0.4551 
 
 
0.0668 
 
 
0.1447 
 
 
-14.857 
 
 
1.38    
 
 
0.168     
 
 
23 
Postindustrial economy in year 
EAC was established or last reformed 
 
 
0.171  
 
 
0.1111 
 
 
0.0872 
 
 
0.0956 
 
 
-14.532 
 
 
1.54    
 
 
0.124      
 
 
23 
 
Popular support:
Public opinion: EU good thing,  
year EAC established or last reformed 
 
 
 
-0.082    
 
 
 
0.0442    
 
 
 
0.2397 
 
 
 
0.0214 
 
 
 
  -8.392 
 
 
 
-1.86    
 
 
 
0.062      
 
 
 
17 
 
Institutions:
Partisan veto players in  
year EAC was established or last reformed  
 
 
 
0.288    
 
 
 
0.3182 
 
 
 
0.0255 
 
 
 
0.3579 
 
 
 
-16.129 
 
 
 
0.91    
 
 
 
0.365     
 
 
 
24 
Agenda control of Parliament   1.316412     0.7357   0.3710  0.0078     6.006  1.79     0.074      15 
Corporatism   7.851235     5.8324  0.6704  0.0005     3.007  1.35     0.178      14 
Strong bicameral legislature  -0.5804496     0.4433  0.0628  0.1675  -14.206  1.31     0.190  22 
Upper house committee
72 -1.163151    0.8367  0.0583  0.1555  -16.299  1.39     0.164      25 
*= Significant at .05 level, ** = Significant at .01 level, *** = Significant at .001 level 
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72 Was an EAC established in the upper house before the lower house established an EAC? 
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